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Abstract
This article will explore the U.S. nuclear export controls regime. It will initially discuss con-
trols affecting the export of nuclear material, facilities, and specially designed components of
nuclear facilities. This section will specifically consider export licensing procedures and require-
ments, agreements for nuclear cooperation, the specific export criteria for major nuclear coopera-
tion, as well as the necessary policy determination. Then the Article will discuss the procedures
and requirements for obtaining a license to export dual-use equipment, the authorization necessary
for the export of nuclear technology and the subsequent arrangement process, which further aids
in the implementation of U.S. non-proliferation policies.
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I. INTRODUCTION-THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME
Since the inauguration of the Eisenhower "Atoms for Peace"
program in 19531 and the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954,2 the United States has engaged in peaceful nuclear
cooperation3 with other nations to share the benefits of civilian nu-
clear energy programs. Such cooperation must take into account
the inherent risks of proliferation, i.e., the further spread of nu-
clear explosives. 4 The nuclear export controls regime plays a major
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The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and do not necessa-
rily represent the views of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
or any other United States Government Agency.
1. The text of President Eisenhower's speech before the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly on Dec. 8, 1953, entitled "Atomic Power for Peace," is reprinted at
100 CONG. REC. 61 (1954); ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY
DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 96th CONG. 2d Sess., NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION FACTBOOK 25-30 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as
FACTBOOK].
2. Act of August 30, 1954, Pub. L. No. 703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Atomic Energy Act].
3. "Peaceful nuclear cooperation" in international usage means the transfer
from one country to another of nuclear material, equipment and technology for civil-
ian applications, e.g., nuclear medicine, operation of research reactors, and electrical
production using nuclear fuel.
4. A nuclear explosive is a device designed for either weapon use or peaceful
purposes, e.g., as a substitute for TNT in a large scale civil construction project. The
design for either purpose is substantially the same.
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role in minimizing this risk. In the United States this regime calls
for United States controls continuing after export, recipient assur-
ances that exports intended for peaceful uses will not be diverted
to an explosives program, and the maintenance of international
safeguards. It also restricts the export of weapons-useable mate-
rial, 5 sensitive nuclear facilities, and classified and sensitive nuclear
technology.6
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NIF) 7 recognizes the balance between sharing nuclear technology
and preventing proliferation. In article IV of the NPT all parties
undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
material and information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
This commitment is tempered by article I in which the nuclear-
weapon state parties8 undertake "not in any way to assist, encour-
age, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive de-
vices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices." 9
The NPT requires that parties not provide, "(a) source or spe-
5. Nuclear material considered to be directly useable for explosive use, i.e.,
separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), i.e., uranium enriched to 20%
or more in the isotope 235 or uranium 233.
6. Classified technology includes information in the category of "Restricted
Data" which is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2014(Y) (1976) as "all data concerning (1) de-
sign, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nu-
clear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy,
but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category
pursuant to Section 2162 of this title." Sensitive nuclear technology is defined as
"any information ... which is not available to the public and which is important to
the design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrich-
ment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy
water, but shall not include Restricted Data controlled pursuant to chapter 12 of the
1954 Act." 22 U.S.C. § 3203(a)(6) (Supp. III 1979). See also 10 C.F.R. § 810.7 (1980).
7. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter cited as NPT]. This
treaty currently has 115 parties. Egypt, the newest signatory, deposited its instru-
ment of ratification on Feb. 26, 1981. For further discussion of the NPT, see M.
WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (1969); Firmage, The Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 711 (1968); Willrich, The
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology Confronts
World Politics, 77 YALE L.J. 1447 (1968); Note, A Survey of the United States Trea-
ties and Agreements Involving the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 10 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 671, 692-94 (1978); 20 STAN. L. REV. 1030 (1968).
8. NPT, supra note 7, art. IX(3) defines a nuclear-weapon state party as a party
which has "manufactured and exploded" a nuclear explosive device prior to Jan. 1,
1967.
9. NPT, supra note 7, art. I.
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cial fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of
special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for
peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material
shall be subject to [International Atomic Energy Agency] safe-
guards ...... 10 This requirement has been further clarified by the
so-called Zangger Committee Guidelines. This is an informal agree-
ment among twenty-one NPT supplier state parties that, in accor-
dance with article III of the NPT, any such party will not export any
item specified on a "trigger list" in the Zangger Guidelines unless
it will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards and a "no-explosive-use pledge," and a "no-retransfer
assurance" has been obtained from the recipient nation."1
In addition, the United States subscribes to the export
guidelines developed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), sub-
scribed to by a group of nineteen supplier states. 12 The NSG
10. Id. art. 111(2). "Source or special fissionable material" refers to the interna-
tionally accepted categorization of nuclear material consisting of certain isotopes and
concentrations of uranium, thorium, and plutonium as defined in the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), done Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093,
T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as Statute]. The Statute specifi-
cally provides:
1. The term "special fissionable material" means plutonium-239;
uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material con-
taining one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as
the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term
"special fissionable material" does not include source material.
3. The term "source material" means uranium containing the mixture
of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; tho-
rium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound,
or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in
such concentation as the Board of Governors shall from time to time deter-
mine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall from time to
time determine.
Id. art. XX. IAEA safeguards, required by article 111(5) of the Statute, refers to a sys-
tem of inspection and material accountancy maintained by the IAEA to detect the
diversion of source or special fissionable material from a peaceful use to any military
or explosive use. Id. arts. III, XII.
11. IAEA, Communications Received from Members Regarding The Export of
Nuclear Material and of Certain Categories of Equipment and Other Material,
INFCIRC/209 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Zangger Guidelines], reprinted in FACT-
BOOK, supra note 1, at 286-93; 14 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 543 (1975).
12. IAEA, Communications Received from Certain Member States Regard-
ing Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment or Technology,
INFCIRC/254 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NSG Guidelines], reprinted in 17 INT'L
LEGAL MATS. 220 (1978).
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Guidelines contain a trigger list of items identical to those on the
list in the Zangger Guidelines. The export of any item on the NSG
Guidelines list requires the supplier to obtain, in addition to the
above stated Zangger Guidelines requirements, physical security
and "no-replication" assurances. 13 The NSG Guidelines also pro-
vide that a supplier should exercise restraint in the transfer of any
sensitive facility or technology or any weapons-useable material;
and that, in the case of the transfer of an enrichment facility or its
technology, the recipient should agree not to utilize any such ex-
port for producing highly enriched uranium (HEU). The NSG
Guidelines recognize that the supplier and the recipient should
reach mutual agreement or arrangements for reprocessing, storage,
alteration, use, or retransfer of weapons-useable material. Thus
United States nuclear export controls are designed to ensure that
obligations under the NPT, including compliance with the Zangger
Guidelines, are met, as well as compliance with the NSG
Guidelines.
The nuclear test explosion undertaken by the Government of
India in 1974, preparation for which involved nuclear technology
and materials supplied by other nations,14 and, more recently, at-
tempts by other countries' 5 to import sensitive nuclear facilities
and technology provided the impetus in the United States for the
imposition of more stringent nuclear export controls. The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) i6 amended the Atomic En-
13. Replication is the construction of a facility based on the same or similar
technology previously transferred or contained in a facility or a major critical compo-
nent thereof previously transferred.
14. Such technology and material had been supplied for the nuclear program in
India which at the time of supply, to the knowledge of the suppliers, was not in-
tended for any explosive applications.
15. For example, the arrangement between Brazil and the Federal Republic of
Germany, signed in 1975, as reported in the New York Times, provides, inter alia,
for the construction of uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 21, 1980, at A10, col. 1. Also of concern have been Pakistan's efforts to obtain
an enrichment plant. See Donnelly & Kramer, Nuclear Energy: Carrying Out U.S.
Nonproliferation Policy, reprinted in FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 497.
16. Act of Mar. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (codified in scattered
sections of 22, 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as NNPA]. For a discussion of the
NNPA, see Bettauer, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 10 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1105-80 (1978); Doub & Weiss, International Nuclear Development in
the Age of Interdependence, 32 VAND. L. REV. 843, 856-62 (1979); Gleason, Nuclear
Power at Home and Abroad: The Quest For a New Nonproliferation Policy, 11
CONN. L. REV. 512, 522-31 (1979).
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ergy Act to include new export criteria, including the requirement
of full-scope safeguards, 17 more comprehensive requirements for
new agreements for cooperation,' 8 and stringent sanction provi-
sions. In addition, Presidents Ford and Carter instituted export
policies which sought to discourage the use of weapons-useable ma-
terial as fuels and to restrict the spread of sensitive nuclear facili-
ties and technology.19
The United States maintains comprehensive nuclear export
controls which require licensing or authorization for the export of
nuclear material, facilities, equipment and technology, and also of
"dual-use equipment"20 which could contribute to a nuclear explo-
sive program. Controls are implemented to place more stringent
conditions upon the most sensitive exports and to expedite pro-
cessing of exports to states with favorable "non-proliferation cre-
dentials," 2' while providing closer scrutiny of exports to states of
proliferation concern.
This Article will explore the United States nuclear export con-
trols regime. It will initially discuss controls affecting the export of
nuclear material, facilities, and specially designed components of
nuclear facilities. This section will specifically consider export
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2157 (Supp. III 1979). Full-scope safeguards means the applica-
tion of IAEA safeguards with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities within a na-
tion's jurisdiction; i.e., not just with respect to material supplied by another nation.
This export requirement became applicable to exports after a period of 18 to 24
months following March 10, 1978, the date of enactment of the NNPA. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2153- 2 153(e) (Supp. III 1979). An agreement for cooperation is
an international agreement providing for nuclear cooperation. The United States cur-
rently has agreements with 19 nations and two international organizations. In addi-
tion, agreements with four other countries have been signed and are awaiting con-
clusion of ratification proceedings. For a further discussion, see notes 48-49 infra
and accompanying text.
19. President Gerald Ford's statement on nuclear policy is reprinted at 12
WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1624-31 (Oct. 28, 1976). President Jimmy Carter's
statement on nuclear policy of April 7, 1977 is reprinted at 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doc. 502-07 (Apr. 7, 1977); FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 121-27. President
Carter's message to the Congress transmitting the proposed Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Policy Act of 1977 is reprinted at 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOc.
611-13 (Apr. 27, 1977).
20. Dual-use equipment refers to items which could be of significance for nu-
clear explosive purposes if used for purposes other than those intended by the ex-
porter.
21. "Non-proliferation credentials" is a term often used to describe assurances
or activities which a nation has given or undertaken to control proliferation, e.g., ad-
herence to the NPT and its efforts to control ext5orts of sensitive nuclear items to a
nation or region of concern.
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licensing procedures and requirements, agreements for nuclear
cooperation, the specific export criteria for major nuclear
cooperation, as well as the necessary policy determination. Then
the Article will discuss the procedures and requirements for ob-
taining a license to export dual-use equipment, the authorization
necessary for the export of nuclear technology and the subsequent
arrangement process which further aids in the implementation of
United States non-proliferation policies.
II. EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, FACILITIES, AND
SPECIALLY DESIGNED COMPONENTS
OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES
A. Procedures for Obtaining an Export License
A Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license is required
for the export of any source or special nuclear material, production
or utilization facility, fuel fabrication plant, heavy water production
plant, specially designed or prepared equipment for any such facil-
ity or plant,22 deuterium or nuclear grade graphite, and by-product
material. 23 This NRC jurisdiction includes all material and equip-
ment covered by the trigger lists in the Zangger Guidelines and
the NSG Guidelines.
To obtain a license 24 an application is filed with the NRC
22. Nuclear material includes: source material (uranium and thorium) 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014(z) (1976); special nuclear material, referred to internationally as special fis-
sionable material (uranium enriched in the isotope 235, plutonium, uranium con-
taining the isotope 233) 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (aa) (1976), deuterium in specified ratios, 10
C.F.R. § 110.2(i) (1980); and by-product material (certain radioactive wastes and tail-
ings) 42 U.S.C. § 2 0 14(e) (Supp. III 1979). A nuclear facility includes a production
facility, i.e., a reactor or critical facility designed to produce special nuclear material
or an enrichment or reprocessing plant, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(v) (1976); a utilization facil-
ity, i.e., a reactor designed to use source or special nuclear material for the produc-
tion of energy, 42 U.S.C. § 2 014(cc) (1976); a heavy water (deuterium) production fa-
cility, i.e., a fuel fabrication facility, 10 C.F.R. § l10.2(y) (1980); and major compo-
nents of a nuclear reactor, 10 C.F.R. § 110.2 (1980), as enumerated in 10 C.F.R. App.
A to Part 110 (1980).
23. An exception to the general licensing requirement arises in exports
involving relatively insignificant amounts of source or special nuclear material which
may be authorized by the Department of Energy for export to other governments.
See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2094, 2074 (Supp. 1980). The NRC is also authorized to exempt
any export from the requirement that a license be issued, but nearly identical find-
ings must be made for such an exemption as are necessary for issuing a license. 42
U.S.C.A. § 2155 (Supp. 1980); 10 C.F.R. § 110.11 (1980).
24. The statutory procedures are set forth in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2155 (Supp. 1980).
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which, before acting,2 5 transmits it to the concerned Executive
Branch agencies. 26 Interagency procedures govern the interagency
review of the license application.2 7 Within fifteen days of receipt
from the NRC, these agencies must review the application and ad-
vise the State Department of their preliminary views, including
whether additional information is required and whether the export
raises unusual policy considerations.2 8 The Department of Energy
is responsible for obtaining confirmation, if required, that the ex-
port is subject to an appropriate agreement for cooperation, that
the recipient is authorized to receive the export, and that physical
security measures to be applied are adequate.2 9
Within thirty days of receipt of the license application, the
State Department transmits to the other Executive Branch
agencies a proposed Executive Branch judgment stating that the
export will not be inimical to the common defense and security.
The proposed judgment also addresses the extent to which the ex-
port criteria are met, the extent to which the cooperating party has
adhered to the provisions of the applicable agreement for
cooperation, and any additional relevant factors. 30
The NRC has authority to issue general licenses for which no application need be
filed. 10 C.F.R. § 110.20 (1980).
25. Applications for export of by-product material may be issued by the NRC
without Executive Branch review, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2155 (Supp. 1980). Furthermore, 10
C.F.R. § 110.41(d) (1980) provides for no Executive Branch review in the case of by-
product material.
26. 10 C.F.R. § 110.44 (1980). The agencies and offices for coordination are: (a)
Department of State-The Office of Export and Import Control in the Nuclear En-
ergy and Energy Technology Division of the Bureau of Oceans and International En-
vironmental and Scientific Affairs; (b) Department of Energy-The Office of the As-
sistant Secretary for Defense Programs; (c) Department of Defense-The Office of
the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs; (d) Department of
Commerce-The Office of Export Administration in the Bureau of Trade Regula-
tions; and (e) Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)-The Nuclear Exports
Division of the Bureau of Non-Proliferation.
27. Procedures Established Pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 25,326-30 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Procedures]. Although in
general the Procedures are the same for export licenses for major items and for all li-
cense applications, in practice, a number of less significant or routine applications
are handled under expedited arrangements, e.g., general licenses issued by the NRC
and generic authorizations granted to NRC by the Executive Branch. Thus, full Ex-
ecutive Branch review does not occur for many less significant or routine export li-
cense applications.
28. Procedures, supra note 27, pt. B, § 1(b).
29. Id. § 1(c).
30. Id. § 1(f).
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Within ten days of receipt of the proposed judgment, the four
Executive Branch agencies must provide written views to the State
Department with their recommendation. 31 The Executive Branch
judgment is to be a unanimous one.32 If an agency does not agree
with the proposed action, there is a procedure for dispute resolu-
tion. The issue is referred first to the Subgroup on Nuclear Export
Coordination of the National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on
Non-Proliferation (SNEC), where it is usually resolved. Otherwise,
there are further appeals, including referral to the President.33
When all agencies concur, the Executive Branch judgment is
transmitted to the NRC.34 The NRC can issue the license only
after receiving such judgment and upon making a finding, based on
assurances received, that the export criteria and other statutory re-
quirements are met. 35 If the NRC does not issue the license be-
cause it is unable to make the statutory determinations, it must re-
fer the application to the President who, upon making a finding
that withholding the export will be "seriously prejudicial to the
achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives, or would
otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security," may au-
thorize the export by Executive Order. 36 The President may also
issue such an Executive Order when there has been no NRC ac-
tion on an application. 37 The export under such an Executive Or-
der may not occur until the President has notified the Congress
and sixty days of continuous session have transpired. The export
"shall not occur" if, during this period, Congress adopts a concur-
rent resolution of disapproval. 38 This procedure was followed in
1978 and 1980 with respect to the applications for export of reactor
fuel and components to India. 39
31. Id. § 1(g).
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2155(a)(1) (Supp. 1980) provides that no license may be is-
sued by the NRC until it "has been notified by the Secretary of State that it is the
judgment of the Executive Branch .... " See also S. REP. No. 467, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 12 (1977).
33. Procedures, supra note 27, pt. A, § 5.
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2155(a)(1) (Supp. 1980).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 2155(b)(2).
37. Id. The President may so act if the NRC has not acted within a statutory
time period, i.e., 120 days after receipt of the Executive Branch judgment, unless fur-
ther proceedings are initiated by the NRC, "upon a finding that further delay would
be excessive and upon making the findings required for such Presidential authoriza-
tion under this subsection .... Id.
38. Id.
39. 124 CONG. REG. H6517-31 (1978) (House disapproval of resolution of disap-
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B. Requirements for Obtaining an Export License
Although the procedures for obtaining an export license are
generally the same for applications for different categories of items,
the statutory requirements which must be met vary. Generally, ex-
ports involving major cooperation require more stringent criteria
than that applied to exports of less significant items. Thus, the ex-
port of any source or special nuclear material, or a production or
utilization facility40 requires an agreement for cooperation, 41 and
determinations that the export is not inimical to the common de-
fense and security. In addition, it must be determined that explicit
statutory criteria in sections 127 and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act
are met. 42 The export of a uranium fuel fabrication plant, compo-
nents, deuterium, or graphite, however, requires only a determi-
nation that the export is not inimical to the common defense and
security and that the less comprehensive criteria of section 109b of
the Atomic Energy Act be met.43 The export of by-product mate-
rial requires only a determination by the NRC that the export is
not inimical to the common defense and security. 44 It should be
noted that equipment can often contain technology subject to addi-
tional export controls which must be met as well. 45 Also, as a mat-
ter of policy, the export of certain sensitive equipment and tech-
nology has been restricted.
1. Agreements for Cooperation
The United States currently has agreements for cooperation
with nineteen states, the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM), and the IAEA. 46 The NNPA directed the President
to seek to renegotiate existing agreements in order to obtain the
additional controls which the law now requires for new agree-
proval); 126 CONG. REC. S 13288 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1980) (Senate disapproval of res-
olution of disapproval).
40. See note 22 supra. For a discussion of "source or special fissionable mate-
rial," see note 10 supra.
41. See note 18 supra.
42. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2155, 2156, 2157 (Supp. 1980). For a discussion of the crite-
ria enumerated in §§ 127-128, see notes 59-65 infra and accompanying text.
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2139(b) (Supp. 1980).
44. Id. § 2155(a).
45. Thus, for example, the less stringent conditions which apply to components
would be only a part of the total requirements which must be met in the case of the
export of a component of an enrichment plant.
46. See note 18 supra.
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ments.4 7 Since the enactment of the NNPA three new or amended
agreements have entered into force, 48 and four other new agree-
ments have been signed and are awaiting ratification. 49
Nuclear cooperation can take place under a bilateral agree-
ment for cooperation or, in the case of an IAEA member state,
through the United States-IAEA agreement. 50 All cooperation by
47. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2153c(a) (Supp. 1980).
48. United States Agreements with Canada have been amended. See Agree-
ment for Cooperation on Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, signed June 15, 1955, United
States-Canada, 6 U.S.T. 2595, T.I.A.S. No. 3304; as amended by: Agreement, signed
June 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 275, T.I.A.S. No. 3771; Agreement, signed May 22, 1959, 10
U.S.T. 1293, T.I.A.S. No. 4271; Agreement, signed June 11, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1780,
T.I.A.S. No. 4518; Agreement, signed May 25, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 1400, T.I.A.S. No.
5102, Protocol Amending the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of
Atomic Energy, signed April 23, 1980 __ U.S.T. __, T.I.A.S. No. 97-59. See also
H.R. Doc. No. 304, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
Similarly, United States agreements with the IAEA have been amended. See
Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, signed May 11,
1959, United States-IAEA, 10 U.S.T. 1424, T.I.A.S. No. 4291; extended and
amended by Agreement, signed Feb. 12, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 1199, T.I.A.S. No. 7852;
Second Amendment to Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, signed Jan. 14, 1980,
United States-I.A.E.A., - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. 97-62. See also S. REP. No.
658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
The United States Agreements with Australia have been superseded. See Agree-
ment for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, signed June 22,
1956, United States-Australia, 8 U.S.T. 738, T.I.A.S. 3830; extended and amended
by Agreement, signed Sept. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 155, T.I.A.S. No. 4687; Agreement,
signed April 11, 1967, 18 U.S.T., 400 T.I.A.S. No. 6250; Agreement Concerning the
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, signed July 27, 1979, United States-Australia,
__ U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 98-93. See also H.R. Doc. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979).
49. New United States agreements with Indonesia, Colombia, Peru, and
Morocco have been signed, reviewed by the Congress, and are now awaiting com-
pletion of ratification proceedings. See Agreement for Cooperation Concerning
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, done June 30, 1980 United States-Indonesia, -
U.S.T. __, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 338, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980); Agreement Concerning Civil Uses of Nuclear Energy, signed Jan. 8, 1981,
United States-Colombia, __ U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. - , reprinted in H.R. DOC.
No. 9, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981); Agreement Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nu-
clear Energy, done June 26, 1980, United States-Peru, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No.
-, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Agreement on
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, done May 30, 1980. United States-Morocco, -
U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. - , reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 321, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980).
50. Agreement for Cooperation signed May 11, 1959, United States-Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 10 U.S.T. 1424, T.I.A.S. No. 4291; Agree-
ment Amending and Extending the Agreement of May 11, 1959, signed Feb. 12,
1974, 25 U.S.T. 1199, T.I.A.S. No. 7852. For a subsequent amendment not yet pub-
lished, see S. REP. No. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980).
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the United States with the ten states which are a part of the Euro-
pean Community is undertaken through the United States-
EURATOM agreements. 5 ' Requirements for cooperation, with one
exception for EURATOM, 5 2 are essentially the same. The United
States has not entered into a new agreement for cooperation with a
state not party to the NPT since 1972. 53
The United States has a program to negotiate new agreements
for cooperation, and to renegotiate existing ones. By statute this ac-
tivity is undertaken by the Secretary of State, with the technical
assistance and concurrence of the Secretary of Energy and in con-
sultation with the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA).54 As a practical matter, ACDA participates in the
formulation of negotiating positions and as a member of negotiating
delegations.
After a negotiated text is initialed, the proposed agreement,
together with the views and recommendations of the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Energy, the NRC, and the Director of
ACDA, is submitted to the President. The Director of ACDA also
submits an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement
(NPAS) "regarding the adequacy of the safeguards and other con-
trol mechanisms and the peaceful use assurances contained in the
agreement ... to ensure that any assistance furnished thereunder
will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive pur-
pose. "55
51. See Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy, signed Nov. 8, 1958, United States-European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM), 10 U.S.T. 75, T.I.A.S. No. 4173; Additional Agreement, signed June
11, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2589, T.I.A.S. No. 4650; Amendment to the Additional Agree-
ment of June 11, 1960, signed May 22, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. No. 5104;
Agreement Amending the Additional Agreement of June; 11, 1960, as amended,
signed Sept. 20, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 472, T.I.A.S. No. 7566.
52. The United States-EURATOM agreement, supra note 51, does not give
the United States rights to approve the reprocessing of United States-origin material
within the European Community. Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act, as
amended, requires as an immediate export criteria, that the United States have rights
over reprocessing of United States-supplied material. EURATOM has been ex-
empted from this criterion, see note 66 infra.
53. Adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is
not a requirement for such an agreement but has been encouraged in United States
negotiations. The requirement of full scope safeguards, however, is a criterion which
must be met. See note 66 infra.
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2153(a) (Supp. 1980). Such negotiations are often undertaken
by designees of such principals.
55. Id.
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After making a determination that the performance of the pro-
posed agreement will promote the common defense and security,
rather than constitute an unreasonable risk, the President author-
izes its execution. 56 Normally, the agreement, signed by represen-
tatives of the two governments involved, is submitted to Congress
together with the presidential approval and determination, the
NPAS, and the concerned agencies' views. 57 If thereafter, during a
period of sixty days of continuous session, Congress takes no action
to disapprove the agreement by concurrent resolution, the agree-
ment can then be brought into force, 58 usually by an exchange of
diplomatic notes.
2. Specific Export Criteria for Major Nuclear Cooperation
Sections 127 and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act 59 contain the
specific criteria which must be met before any export for peaceful
nuclear uses of any source or special nuclear material, production
or utilization facility, or sensitive nuclear technology may occur.
The criteria in section 127 require that assurances have been
given to the United States that the exported material or facility (1)
will be subject to IAEA safeguards as required by article 111(2) of
the NPT; (2) will not be used for nuclear explosive development;
(3) will be subject to adequate physical security; (4) will not be
retransferred without United States consent; and, in the case of
material, (5) will not be reprocessed or, after irradiation, otherwise
altered without United States consent. 60 In the case of sensitive
nuclear technology, section 127 requires assurances of no-retransfer
without United States consent, and no-explosive development and
that the foregoing controls will apply to material or equipment pro-
duced or replicated through the use of such exported technology.61
In the case of the last two criteria the assurances must also cover
56. Id. § 2153(b).
57. Id. § 2 153(c).
58. Id. § 2153(d). In the case of an agreement limited to a reactor capable of
producing not more than 5 thermal megawatts and its fuel, no NPAS needs to be
submitted to the Congress, only to the President, and the Congress has only 30 days
of continuous session to act to disapprove the agreement. Id. § 2153(c).
59. Id. §§ 2156, 2157. The text of these sections is set forth in the appendix to
this Article.
60. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2156 (Supp. 1980).
61. Id. § 2156(4).
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special nuclear material produced by the exported material;6 2 in
the case of the first three criteria the assurances must also cover
special nuclear material produced by the exported material. 63 In
addition, the assurances for the first two criteria must be retroac-
tive to cover material or equipment previously exported pursuant
to an agreement for cooperation. 64
The criterion in section 128 now requires, as a condition of
supply, that a recipient state have all of its peaceful nuclear activi-
ties under IAEA safeguards. 65 This includes indigenous activities as
well.
These criteria for major nuclear cooperation are met by com-
mitments under the applicable agreement for cooperation although
the physical security assurance is met through an exchange of
notes. The United States does not have reprocessing control over
exports to EURATOM, but cooperation with EURATOM nations is
continuing under a presidential waiver provided in the Atomic En-
ergy Act. 66 In addition to satisfying the specific export criteria, a
determination must be made that "the export will not be inimical
to the common defense and security." 67
In addition, no nuclear export can be made to any state which
engages in certain activities proscribed by section 129 of the
Atomic Energy Act. 68 These activities include detonation of a nu-
clear explosive device, material breach of certain agreements, and
engaging in certain actions directly related to weapons acquisitions
or which have a weapons-related motivation. 69
62. Id. §§ 2156(4), (5).
63. Id. §§ 2156(1), (2), (3).64. Id. §§ 2156(l), (2).
65. Id. §§ 2157(a)(1), (b).
66. Id. § 2155(a)(2). The statute provides for an initial exemption from this cri-
terion which expired on March 9, 1980 and was extended until March 10, 1981,
Exec. Order No. 12193, 45 Fed. Reg. 9885 (1980). On Feb. 24, 1981 the exemption
was extended a second time to March 10, 1982 by Exec. Order No. 12295, 46 Fed.
Reg. 14,113 (1981).
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2155(a)(1) (Supp. 1980). This requirement is often referred to
as the "non-inimicality" finding, see note 42 supra and accompanying text. In lieu of
making a non-inimicality finding, the Executive Branch, under this statute, may find
that "any export in the category to which the proposed export belongs would not be
inimical to the common defense and security because it lacks significance for nuclear
explosive purposes." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2155(a)(1) (Supp. 1980).
68. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2158(2)(A)-(C) (Supp. 1980). The text of this section is set
forth in the appendix to this Article.
69. Id. § 2158(1)(A)-(D).
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3. Specific Export Criteria for Other Nuclear Cooperation
Section 109b of the Atomic Energy Act directs the NRC, after
consultations with ACDA and the Departments of State, Energy
and Commerce, to determine "which component parts . . . and
which other items or substances are especially relevant from the
standpoint of export control because of their significance for nu-
clear explosive purposes." 70 The NRC made such a determination 71
concerning parts and components especially designed or prepared
for use in a production or utilization facility, and heavy water and
nuclear grade graphite. 72 Section 109b contains the criteria which
must be met before any export of items subject to section 109b
may occur. Assurances must have been given to the United States
that the exported item will trigger 73 IAEA safeguards, will not be
used for any explosive purpose and will not be retransferred with-
out United States consent.
4. Policy Determination
In addition to the legal requirements for exports, President
Carter established substantial guidance to govern the export of es-
pecially sensitive items: plutonium, highly enriched uranium
(HEU), sensitive nuclear technology or plutonium fabrication tech-
nology.74 This was designed to discourage the use of weapons-
useable material as fuel, and to limit the spread of the sensitive nu-
clear technology 75 which provides direct access to weapons-useable
70. Id. § 2139(b).
71. See 10 C.F.R. § 110 (1980).
72. These components exclude four categories of "major components" of reac-
tors, e.g., the pressure vessel, which because of their significance are treated as reac-
tors for export control purposes. 10 C.F.R. § 110.2(ss) (1980). Heavy water and graph-
ite are moderator material essential to the operation of reactors utilizing unenriched
uranium.
73. "Trigger" means that while the item itself will not be directly subject to
safeguards its use with source or special nuclear material, and in some cases in a nu-
clear facility, will "trigger" application of safeguards with respect to such material or
facility.
74. Factsheet on the Proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977,
April 27, 1977, reprinted in 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 611-13 (April 27,
1977). Such procedures for Presidential approval were established as a matter of pol-
icy by President Carter, and would not necessarily be continued by the new admin-
istration.
75. Sensitive nuclear technology is defined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act as:
[Any information (including information incorporated in a production or
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material. President Carter required that exports of plutonium
greater than one kilogram be approved directly by him, and that
exports of HEU greater than fifteen kilograms be approved directly
by him after completion of a technical and economic justification on
the recipient's need for the HEU.
In recent years, only incidental assistance to foreign enrich-
ment, reprocessing, and heavy water production facilities under
safeguards and other conditions has been provided. Cooperation in
breeder technology has been limited in scope.
III. EXPORT OF DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT
A. Procedures for Obtaining an Export License
Dual-use items are items other than nuclear material and
equipment, which could be of significance for nuclear explosives
but which are exported for other purposes. 76 These items are li-
censed by the Commerce Department pursuant to section 309(c) of
the NNPA77 and the Export Administration Act of 1979.78
Dual-use items are listed in the Nuclear Referral List con-
tained in the Commerce Department regulations, 79 and include
commodities which could be of direct or indirect use in the pro-
duction of special nuclear material, nuclear explosive development
and testing, e.g., state-of-the-art computers, flash x-rays, lasers, or
high-speed cameras.
To obtain an export license, an application is filed with the
Commerce Department.80 Any application for an item on the Nu-
clear Referral List is generally referred to the Department of En-
ergy for technical review, and the Department of Energy will con-
cur in the proposed export if no proliferation problem is present.
utilization facility or important component part thereof) which is not avail-
able to the public and which is important to the design, construction, fabri-
cation, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel
reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy water, but shall
not include Restricted Data controlled pursuant to chapter 12 of the 1954
Act.
22 U.S.C. § 3203(a)(6) (Supp. I1 1979).
76. See note 20 supra.
77. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2139a (Supp. 1980).
78. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. App. 2401 (Supp. III (1979)).
79. 15 C.F.R. § 378 (1980).
80. 15 C.F.R. §§ 372.5, 378.6 (1980).
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In such cases the Commerce Department will issue the license;
however, applications which, in the view of the Department of En-
ergy or the Commerce Department, raise policy considerations or
other concerns are referred to the SNEC for review by the con-
cerned Executive Branch agencies and the NRC.81 The SNEC pro-
vides the Department of Energy with guidance concerning the
type of cases which should receive full review. Any disagreements
with respect to approval of the application are settled using the
same dispute settlement procedures as for consideration of NRC li-
censes.
82
B. Requirements for Obtaining an Export License
There are no express statutory criteria which need to be met
in the licensing of dual-use items. The SNEC, however, has estab-
lished precedence and policy guidance on exports for sensitive fa-
cilities and exports to countries of proliferation concern. When
evaluating an export license application for dual-use equipment,
the SNEC considers (a) the stated end-use; (b) the sensitivity of the
particular item and its availability elsewhere; (c) the assurances
given in the particular case; and (b) foreign policy and national se-
curity considerations. 83
IV. EXPORT OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
An export of nuclear technology84 must be either authorized
by the Secretary of Energy or specifically authorized in an agree-
ment for cooperation. 85 If the technology is not classified as Re-
stricted Data or does not relate to reprocessing, enrichment, heavy
water production, or plutonium fuel fabrication, it may be exported
under a general authorization contained in Department of Energy
regulations other than to nations in the Soviet bloc or nations to
81. Procedures, supra note 26, pt. F.
82. See note 32 supra.
83. 45 Fed. Reg. 43,142-43 (1980) (to be codified in 5 C.F.R. § 378.4).
84. The term "nuclear technology" is not defined in the Atomic Energy Act;
however, its export is controlled by restricting the production of special nuclear ma-
terial abroad by any person, defined at 42 U.S.C. § 2014(s) (1976), generally any
entity subject to United States jurisdiction, except the Department of Energy. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 2077(b) (Supp. 1980). The term includes all such technologies ranging
from the most benign to the most sensitive, i.e., those in the category of Restricted
Data, for which a special agreement for cooperation and Presidential determination
is needed.
85. Id. § 2077(b).
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which all United States exports are restricted generally.8 6 In the
case of any proposed export of sensitive nuclear technology, the ex-
port criteria in sections 127 and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act
must be satisfied. 87
When a specific authorization by the Secretary of Energy is
sought, he must first determine that the activity for which the ex-
port will be utilized "will not be inimical to the interest of the
United States." 88 When a request for such an authorization is re-
ceived, it is distributed by the Department of Energy to ACDA,
the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense, and the NRC
for review in accordance with substantially the same procedures
used for consideration of NRC licenses.89 If unanimous concur-
rence is not obtained, similar dispute resolution procedures are
also available; however, in the case of such authorizations, the Sec-
retary of Energy by statute may act after consultation with the con-
cerned agencies and with the concurrence of the State Depart-
ment. 90
V. SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS
Subsequent arrangements are defined by section 131 of the
Atomic Energy Act as "arrangements entered into by any agency
or department of the United States Government with respect to
cooperation with any nation or group of nations (but not purely pri-
vate or domestic arrangements) involving [nuclear supply contracts,
approvals for retransfer under an agreement for cooperation,
arrangements for physical security, safeguards, or the storage or
disposition of irradiated fuel elements] and any other arrange-
ments which the President finds to be important from the stand-
point of preventing proliferation."91
It is through the subsequent arrangement process that the
United States exercises its consent rights in agreements for co-
operation over retransfer and reprocessing of nuclear material and
equipment subject to such agreements, and enters into enrichment
and other supply contracts92 and safeguards arrangements.
86. 10 C.F.R. § 810.7 (1980).
87. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2156, 2157 (Supp. 1980); for a discussion of the criteria in §§
127-128, see note 59 supra.
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2077(b)(2) (Supp. 1980).
89. Procedures, supra note 27, pt. D.
90. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2077(b)(2) (Supp. 1980).
91. Id. § 2160(a)(2)(A)-(G).
92. The Department of Energy operates all United States enrichment facilities.
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A request for a subsequent arrangement is filed with the De-
partment of Energy or in certain cases initiated by the Department
of Energy which transmits the request to ACDA, the Departments
of State, Commerce, and Defense, and the NRC. 93 No later than
fifteen days after receipt of each request the five agencies must re-
view the request and provide the Department of Energy with pre-
liminary views, including whether the request will involve more
extensive consideration than normal or whether additional informa-
tion is required. 94 Thereupon, within fifteen days the Department
of Energy prepares and transmits to the other agencies its pro-
posed subsequent arrangement or other course of action. 95 Within
twenty days of receipt of a subsequent arrangement proposed by
the Department of Energy, all agencies must provide written views
to the Office of Nuclear Affairs at the Department of Energy. 96 The
ACDA response must state whether it intends to prepare an
NPAS, which in the case of a subsequent arrangement may be pre-
pared if, in the Director's view, a proposed subsequent arrange-
ment might significantly contribute to proliferation. 97
After receipt of all agency views and, if necessary, the NPAS,
the Secretary of Energy with the concurrence of the Secretary of
State shall decide whether to enter into the proposed subsequent
arrangement.98 This decision, along with the determination of the
Secretary of Energy that the arrangement will not be inimical to
the common defense and security, must be published in the Fed-
eral Register. 9 Subsequent arrangements for approval of re-
An enrichment services contract is concluded between the Department of Energy
and foreign or domestic utilities or other entities whereby the Department of Energy
agrees to enrich nuclear material for the utility. Enrichment is the process whereby
the percentage of the fissionable isotope of uranium U-235 is increased relative to
the non-fissionable isotope U-238. Uranium in nature contains .7% U-235. For use as
nuclear fuel in power reactors the U-235 must be increased to 3%. Many research re-
actors utilize fuel enriched to 93% U-235. An enrichment services contract is only a
commitment to enrich material and does not include a commitment to provide the
nuclear material for enrichment or to export the material to the foreign utility. Other
supply contracts include agreements for the sale of nuclear material by the United
States.
93. Procedures, supra note 27, pt. E, § 1(a).
94. Id. § 1(b).
95. Id. § 1(c).
96. Id. § 1(d).
97. Id.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2160(a)(2) (Supp. 1980).
98. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2160(a)(1) (Supp. 1980).
99. Id.
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processing or retransfer of plutonium require a further determina-
tion by the Secretary of Energy that such activities "will not result
in a significant increase in the risk of proliferation;" and must be
reported to the Congress and not take effect for a period thereafter
of fifteen days of continuous session. 10° Any subsequent arrang-
ement involving the transfer of spent-power reactor fuel to the
United States is subject to a special congressional review mecha-
nism set forth in section 131.101
If any disagreements arise during the Executive Branch proc-
essing of a subsequent arrangement, they are settled using the
same procedures as for NRC licenses. ' 0 2
CONCLUSION
The United States has sought to cooperate with other nations
in the peaceful application of nuclear energy without increasing the
risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. To that end, it has established
a legal and procedural framework for nuclear exports which ensures
that material, equipment, and technology exported from the
United States for use in peaceful nuclear activities do not contrib-
ute to proliferation. This framework also ensures that United States
international obligations are met and that nuclear exports do not
harm United States national security interests.
Nuclear export control is clearly only part of the United States
effort to prevent the worldwide spread of nuclear explosives. It is,
however, an important part of international efforts to prevent pro-
liferation, and has been a consistent element of United States ef-
forts since the 1940's.
100. Id. § 2160(b). There is an exemption for a determination of emergency by
the President. Id. § 2160(b)(1).
101. Id. § 2160(f).
102. Procedures, supra note 27, pt. A, § 6.
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APPENDIX
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2156-2158 (Supp. 1980)
§ 2156. Criteria governing United States nuclear exports
The United States adopts the following criteria which, in addition to
other requirements of law, will govern exports for peaceful nuclear uses
from the United States of source material, special nuclear material, pro-
duction or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology:
(1) IAEA safeguards as required by Article 111(2) of the Treaty
will be applied with respect to any such material or facilities pro-
posed to be exported, to any such material or facilities previously ex-
ported and subject to the applicable agreement for cooperation, and
to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use
thereof.
(2) No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology
proposed to be exported or previously exported and subject to the
applicable agreement for cooperation, and no special nuclear material
produced through the use of such materials, facilities, or sensitive
nuclear technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or
for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device.
(3) Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with
respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to
any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use
thereof. Following the effective date of any regulations promulgated
by the Commission pursuant to section 2156a of this title, physical
security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures pro-
vide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the applica-
ble regulations.
(4) No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology
proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced
through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdic-
tion of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval
of the United States is obtained for such retransfer. In addition to
other requirements of law, the United States may approve such re-
transfer only if the nation or group of nations designated to receive
such retransfer agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions re-
quired by this section.
(5) No such material proposed to be exported and no special nu-
clear material produced through the use of such material will be
reprocessed, and no irradiated fuel elements containing such material
removed from a reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless
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the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such re-
processing or alteration.
(6) No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported un-
less the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material
or equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdic-
tion of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use
of any such exported sensitive nuclear technology.
§ 2157. Additional export criterion and procedures
(a)(1) As a condition of continued United States export of source ma-
terial, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any
sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such export
shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect to all
peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out un-
der the control of such state at the time of the export.
(2) The President shall seek to achieve adherence to the foregoing
criterion by recipient non-nuclear-weapon states.
(b) The criterion set forth in subsection (a) of this section shall be ap-
plied as an export criterion with respect to any application for the export
of materials, facilities, or technology specified in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion which is filed after eighteen months from March 10, 1978, or for any
such application under which the first export would occur at least twenty-
four months after March 10, 1978, except as provided in the following
paragraphs:
(1) If the Commission or the Department of Energy, as the case
may be, is notified that the President has determined that failure to
approve an export to which this subsection applies because such cri-
terion has not yet been met would be seriously prejudicial to the
achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or other-
wise jeopardize the common defense and security, the license or au-
thorization may be issued subject to other applicable requirements of
law: Provided, That no such export of any production or utilization fa-
cility or of any source or special nuclear material (intended for use as
fuel in any production or utilization facility) which has been licensed
or authorized pursuant to this subsection shall be made to any non-
nuclear-weapon state which has failed to meet such criterion until the
first such license or authorization with respect to such state is
submitted to the Congress (together with a detailed assessment of the
reasons underlying the President's determination, the judgment of
the executive branch required under section 2155 of this title, and
any Commission opinion and views) for a period of sixty days of con-
tinuous session (as defined in section 2159(g) of this title) and
referred to the Committee on International Relations of the House of
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Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate, but such export shall not occur if during such sixty-day period
the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that
the Congress does not favor the proposed export. Any such license or
authorization shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth
in section 2159 of this title for the consideration of Presidential sub-
missions.
(2) If the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval pursuant to
paragraph (1), no further export of materials, facilities, or technology
specified in subsection (a) of this section shall be permitted for the
remainder of that Congress, unless such state meets the criterion or
the President notifies the Congress that he has determined that sig-
nificant progress has been made in achieving adherence to such crite-
rion by such state or that United States foreign policy interests dic-
tate reconsideration and the Congress, pursuant to the procedure of
paragraph (1), does not adopt a concurrent resolution stating in sub-
stance that it disagrees with the President's determination.
(3) If the Congress does not adopt a resolution of disapproval
with respect to a license or authorization submitted pursuant to para-
graph (1), the criterion set forth in subsection (a) of this section shall
not be applied as an export criterion with respect to exports of mate-
rials, facilities and technology specified in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion to that state: Provided, That the first license or authorization
with respect to that state which is issued pursuant to this paragraph
after twelve months from the elapse of the sixty-day period specified
in paragraph (1), and the first such license or authorization which is
issued after each twelve-month period thereafter, shall be submitted
to the Congress for review pursuant to the procedures specified in
paragraph (1): Provided further, That if the Congress adopts a resolu-
tion of disapproval during any review period provided for by this par-
agraph, the provisions of paragraph (2) shall apply with respect to fur-
ther exports to such state.
§ 2158. Conduct resulting in termination of nuclear exports
No nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology
shall be exported to--
(1) any non-nuclear-weapon state that is found by the President
to have, at any time after March 10, 1978,
(A) detonated a nuclear explosive device; or
(B) terminated or abrogated IAEA safeguards; or
(C) materially violated an IAEA safeguards agreement; or
(D) engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear
material and having direct significance for the manufacture or ac-
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quisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take
steps which, in the President's judgment, represent sufficient
progress toward terminating such activities; or
(2) any nation or group of nations that is found by the President
to have, at any time after March 10, 1978,
(A) materially violated an agreement for cooperation with
the United States, or, with respect to material or equipment not
supplied under an agreement for cooperation, materially violated
the terms under which such material or equipment was supplied
or the terms of any commitments obtained with respect thereto
pursuant to section 2153a(a) of this title; or
(B) assisted, encouraged, or induced any non-nuclear-wea-
pon state to engage in activities involving source or special nu-
clear material and having direct significance for the manufacture
or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take
steps which, in the President's judgment, represent sufficient
progress toward terminating such assistance, encouragement, or
inducement; or
(C) entered into an agreement after March 10, 1978, for the
transfer of reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to
the sovereign control of a non-nuclear-weapon state except in
connection with an international fuel cycle evaluation in which
the United States is a participant or pursuant to a subsequent in-
ternational agreement or understanding to which the United
States subscribes;
unless the President determines that cessation of such exports would be
seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation
objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security: Pro-
vided, That prior to the effective date of any such determination, the
President's determination, together with a report containing the reasons
for his determination, shall be submitted to the Congress and referred to
the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for a period of
sixty days of continuous session (as defined in section 2159(g) of this title),
but any such determination shall not become effective if during such
sixty-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in
substance that it does not favor the determination. Any such determina-
tion shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section
2159 of this title for the consideration of Presidential submissions.
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